4．結論：金磚集團向何處去？中國向何處去？

到2020年，中國毫無疑問是一個大國，世界前兩大經濟體之一，這已經沒有任何疑問了。它的崛起改變了由美國和現行大國領導建立的秩序。美國鼓勵所有金磚國家融入世界經濟，尤其是支持鄧小平極為成功地為中國制定的“改革開放”戰略。作為這一過程的一部分，中俄加入（或再加入）了布雷頓森林秩序。當這些新興大國崛起后，現行大國經常抵制領導作用分享。盡管中國和其他金磚國家從未想要拋棄全球治理秩序，中國仍聲稱有自己的規則制定權力，作為崛起中的大國這是自然的，并借助外部選項獲得地區和全球影響力。

競爭性大國政治的回歸使現有的中國和金磚國家模式復雜化了，但并未使它不可行。再往前走，中國不需要依賴金磚集團，但金磚集團對北京的國際戰略仍有作用。中國繼續表明在它認為重要的問題上有金融治略的領導作用，但像歷史上的其他大國一樣，有時候它的行為也好像它有權力重寫或重新解釋全球規范和規則，以相對于他國更有利。

本書的末章論述了金磚國家集團若能回到最初的原則，該集團未來的成功將更有可能。最初使金磚國家走到一起的原因在于它們是世界上最大的、增長迅速的經濟體，意欲在塑造國際關系中發揮更大作用。從吉姆·奧尼爾（當時是高盛的首席經濟學家）到勞倫斯·薩默斯的杰出精英人士，承認金磚國家政府應成為頂尖國際政策制定者中的組成部分。然而，甚至在2020年初全球疫情暴發之前，多數金磚國家經濟體都在經歷增速放緩，若非經濟停滯的話。確保它們持續的國際影響力要求金磚國家在利用了易得的增長來源后提高生產率，避開中等收入陷阱。這一研究支持了社會科學家們的發現，即如果它們未能調整其制度水平以適應每一個階段的發展，各國在每一個發展水平上都存在風險，跌入一個低增長均衡。對制度水平持續改進的需要不僅適用于中低收入國家，也適用于頂尖的經濟體如中國和美國。(34)

就金磚國家在完成困難的國內改革任務時顯示領導作用的程度而言，它也抬升了其聲望、可信度和影響力。世界面臨緊迫的多種全球性挑戰——從傳染病到氣候變化到貧困及核擴散，如果大國的領導人能抵制過分的單邊主義和重商主義，表明在增強多邊機構方面的領導作用，這些問題就能獲得最佳的解決辦法，這些多邊機構實際上有助于建設一個更可持續的未來。鑒于未來充滿了各種風險和不確定性，本書的作者們為鄧小平在面對需要“摸著石頭過河”的改革時實行的路徑點贊。如果它們決定堅毅前行，金磚國家和中國是大有前途的。

2020年4月

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(1)　存在至少三種主要國際秩序：（1）布雷頓森林經濟治理秩序，金磚國家成員是其積極參與者，就中國而言是自1944年開始；（2）聯合國治理秩序，其中俄羅斯和中國是五常俱樂部成員，與其他常任理事國合作，包括保護其特權地位；（3）美國的同盟安全秩序，不包括任何金磚國家成員。

(2)　八次年度峰會（2009—2016）各個公報都呼吁全球儲備多元化，擺脫美元，指出“為不同的力量格局設計的國際治理結構正顯示出喪失合法性和有效性的明顯跡象”，這羞辱了西方各國政府。見第六次金磚國家峰會公報。金磚國家峰會公報及其他文件的完整匯編，見the BRICS Information Centre，University of Toronto，Canada，http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/。

(3)　除非專門說明，經濟增長數據來自國際貨幣基金組織的《世界經濟展望》（World Economic Outlook，Washington，D.C.：IMF，October，2019）。

(4)　然而，美國已不再是凈債權大國。現在美國是最大的債務國，而今日最大的債權國，根據所擁有的外國凈資產（凈國際投資地位即NIIP），是日本、德國和中國。關于各國的國際貨幣和金融力量的不同面向，見Leslie Elliott Armijo，Daniel C. Tirone and Hyoung-kyu Chey，“The Monetary and Financial Powers of States：Theory，Dataset，and Observations on the Trajectory of American Dominance，”New Political Economy 25，no. 2（2020），174-194。

(5)　進一步的發展，見Cynthia Roberts，“The BRICS in the Era of Renewed Great Power Competition，”Strategic Analysis 43，no. 6 (2019)：1-18。

(6)　“National Security Strategy of the United States of America,”December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

(7)　Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. (emphasis in the original), p. 2.

(8)　Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Us Intelligence Community, January 29, 2019.

(9)　Ketian Zhang, “Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea,” International Security 44: 1 (Summer 2019): 157; Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?”International Security 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013): 7-48.

(10)　Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War. Princeton University Press, 2014; David A. Lake, “Economic openness and great power competition: Lessons for China and the United States,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, no. 3 (2018): 237-270.

(11)　European Commission, “EU-China: A Strategic Outlook,”12 March 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/eu-china-strategic-outlook-commission-contribution-european-council-21-22-march-2019_en.

(12)　See for example, the annual reports to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission; and “Made in China 2025” Mercator Institute for China Studies, December 2016.

(13)　The estimates of China's investment to the BRI varies ranging from ＄1.2 to 1.3 billion by 2027 to as high as ＄8 trillion.

(14)　Kevin G. Cai, “The One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Beijing's New Strategy of Geoeconomics and Geopolitics,” Journal of Contemporary China 27 no. 114 (2018): 831-847.

(15)　Weifeng Zhou, and Mario Esteban, “Beyond Balancing: China's Approach towards the Belt and Road Initiative,” Journal of Contemporary China 27 no. 112 (2018): 487-501.

(16)　World Bank, Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors. Washington D.C.: World Bank. (2019), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/31878/9781464813924.pdf.

(17)　World Bank, Belt and Road Economics, Chapter 4.

(18)　The G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bankers meeting at Fukuoka in June 2019 first endorsed these principles.

(19)　AIIB. 2020, “Project Summary: Approved Projects,” https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/summary/index.html.

(20)　AIIB. 2020, “AIIB Looks to Launch USD5 Billion COVID-19 Crisis Recovery Facility,” https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2020/AIIB-Looks-to-Launch-USD5-Billion-COVID-19-Crisis-Recovery-Facility.html.

(21)　NDB, “Opening Address of Mr. K. V. Kamath, President, New Development Bank at the Fourth Annual Meeting on April 1, 2019,” 1 April 2019. https://www.ndb.int/president_desk/opening-address-mr-k-v-kamath-president-new-development-bank-fourth-annual-meeting-april-1-2019/.

(22)　NDB, “New Development Bank Issues Coronavirus Combating Bond Raising RMB 5 Bln,”3 April 2020. https://www.ndb.int/press_release/new-development-bank-issues-coronavirus-combating-bond-raising-rmb-5-bln/.

(23)　Xinhua, “IMF to Consider Nomination of Kristalina Georgieva for Managing Director,”9 September 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/09/c_138378908.htm.

(24)　China's Foreign Ministry press release “Working Together to Defeat the COVID-19 Outbreak,”26 March 2020. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1761899.shtml.

(25)　IMF. 2020, “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER),” https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4. See also Eswar Prasad, “Has the Dollar Lost Ground as the Dominant International Currency?”Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution (September 2019). https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/DollarInGlobalFinance.final_.9.20.pdf.

(26)　“Dethroning the Dollar,” The Economist, January 18, 2020; Cynthia Roberts, “Avoid Allowing Opponents to ‘Beat America at its Own Game’: Ensuring US Financial and Currency Power,”in Chinese Strategic Intentions: A Deep Dive into China's Worldwide Activities (SMA White Paper, 2019), chapter 23; and Orange Wang and Zhou Xin, “Coronavirus sparks US dollar dilemma for China as Federal Reserve ramps up easing,” South China Morning Post, March 26, 2020.

(27)　Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Jan Knoerich, and Yuanfang Li, “The Role of London and Frankfurt in Supporting the Internationalisation of the Chinese Renminbi,” New Political Economy 24 no. 4 (2019): 530-545.

(28)　Barry Eichengreen and Guangtao Xia, “China and the SDR: Financial Liberalization through the Back Door,” Quarterly Journal of Finance 9 no.03 (2019): 1-36; Hyoung-kyu Chey and Yu Wai Vic Li, “Chinese Domestic Politics and the Internationalization of the Renminbi,” Political Science Quarterly 135 no. 1 (2020): 37-65.

(29)　Roberts, “Avoid Allowing Opponents to ‘Beat America at its Own Game, ’”p. 149.

(30)　Jonathan Cheng, “China Rolls out Pilot Test of Digital Currency,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2020; “What is China's Digital Currency Plan?”Financial Times, November 25, 2019.

(31)　Nikkei Asian Review, May 20, 2019.

(32)　“Russia Says BRICS Nations Favor Idea of Common Payment System,” Moscow Times, November 14, 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/11/14/putin-to-invite-china-and-india-to-join-anti-sanctions-bank-network-a68172.

(33)　Eric Helleiner and Hongying Wang, “Limits to the BRICS' Challenge: Credit Rating Reform and Institutional Innovation in Global Finance,” Review of International Political Economy 25 no. 5 (2018): 573-595.

(34)　Thomas Philippon, The Great Reversal: How America Gave up on Free Markets (Belknap Press, 2019).