附錄：南海辯論中英文實錄

辯論一：王冠與美國專家瓦格納關于“南海仲裁”的辯論
時間：2016年7月

中文翻譯

今日俄羅斯美洲臺《交叉辯論》主持人彼得·拉韋爾（以下簡稱“主持人”）：海牙國際仲裁法院已經做出壓倒性的裁決，反對中國在南海的領土主張，中國不但拒絕接受這一裁決，甚至也拒絕參加“仲裁庭審”?，F在就中國南海進行交叉辯論，我們請到了在華盛頓的王冠來參加，他是中國中央電視臺北美分臺的首席時政記者。還有來自紐約的丹尼爾·瓦格納，他是美國國家風險方案公司的首席執行官。王冠，我先問問你對南海仲裁的管轄權、參與和執法的看法。許多人都有這個疑問。

中國中央電視臺北美分臺首席時政記者王冠（以下簡稱“王冠”）：彼得，如果我們先把西方主流媒體對“南海仲裁”的報道放到一邊，去一章一章地仔細讀一下《聯合國海洋法公約》（簡稱“《公約》”），我們會發現，此案的本質是仲裁法院對一個自己沒有管轄權的事情做出了“裁定”，而“裁定”的是一個由菲律賓對中國提起的、地緣政治味道十足的案子。讓我來詳細解釋一下?！豆s》第15部分第3節第298條規定：法院不能裁決主權問題。那么海牙仲裁法院是否對主權做出了裁決呢？從文字上看，沒有。但實質上，卻有。

讓我們來看看吧。它“裁定”了中國的南海九段線。中國主張在斷續線內對相關島嶼及其海域擁有主權。當你“裁定”那條線無效時，就等于把主權無效化了。所以它“裁決”了主權。此外，“仲裁”還判定了一些南海地貌的性質，判定了它們是礁還是島。即便在太平島和永興島上有餐廳、銀行，甚至有互聯網、無線（局域）網（Wi-Fi）和手機4G信號，仲裁法院還是“裁定”它們不是島，因此不能享有12海里的領海主權。這是“裁決”了領土。最終那份“裁決”還“裁定”中國的填海造島等行為非法，這也與領土和主權有關。簡而言之，仲裁法院以“裁決”其他議題當幌子把主權問題給“裁定”了，它看似沒有違反《公約》的法律文字，卻違反了《公約》的法律精神。另外請容許我補充一下，《公約》第295條說爭議各方應該在尋求仲裁解決前窮盡“當地救濟措施”（比如雙邊談判），而菲律賓并沒有這樣做。

美國國家風險方案公司首席執行官丹尼爾·瓦格納（以下簡稱“丹尼爾·瓦格納”）：我們可以大玩文字游戲，但最終發生的，是中國聲稱對南海的一大片區域擁有主權，而除中國外沒有人同意這一點，這有點像其他國家說，你看我就是喜歡這一片水和這些島嶼，我覺得它們就應該是我的。至于尋求雙邊談判，在這個問題上有許多國家也是聲索國并尋求與中國展開雙邊談判，但在這方面中國一直表現得不情不愿。我認為這次仲裁是國際法效力的證明，表明諸如菲律賓這樣的小國可以用法律的方式對抗像中國這樣的大國，并取得勝利?，F在仲裁法院做出了這樣的裁決，并不是因為這是大衛戰勝了哥利亞，而是因為仲裁法院經過仔細研究，認為中方的觀點是不合理的、站不住腳的，除了中國人自己，沒人認可中國的觀點。

王冠：事實上你說的是沒有西方國家認可中國的觀點。有中東、非洲和東歐等地好幾十個國家支持中國。這些國家支持中國，是因為他們沒有相信西方的敘事。在這個問題上，西方版本的敘事非常有意思。他們簡單化地進行了有選擇性的報道，似乎在南海的法律比拼中，菲律賓以1︰0戰勝了中國，而中國卻不遵守國際法。我不知道有多少西方編輯和記者仔細讀過《公約》。如果他們讀過了，他們會質疑自己得出這些結論的前提，比如：海牙常設仲裁法院對主權問題有沒有司法管轄權？能不能繞著彎裁決主權？我也不知道有多少西方記者和編輯與不同于西方主流觀點的法律學者深度交流過，或者在報道中引述過他們的觀點。那些學者會指出，很多法律原則支持中方觀點，例如“禁止反言”。這個概念的意思是，如果一個國家曾經承認他國的南海主權，比如20世紀70年代越南時任總理范文同就承認過中國南海主權，那么它就不能在幾十年后反悔。我們在西方媒體上看不到這些觀點。另外，西方媒體在這件事的報道上斷章取義，仿佛中國突然開始向浩瀚的海洋里傾倒砂石、填海造陸。他們忘記了一個簡單的事實，在“二戰”之后，美國曾借軍艦幫助中國收復南海島嶼，默認中國的南海主權聲索。我們在西方媒體上沒有看到任何類似的報道。所以說，是的，西方媒體是相對自由的，但自由的媒體也是有偏見的。是的，他們注明了每一處消息來源，但他們的來源是誰？他們多少次真心引述過非西方的消息源？是的，他們把帶感情色彩的形容詞都注明出處，但他們精心挑選和構建的名詞呢？比如“共產主義中國” 或者 “具有法律約束力的仲裁”。這些看似客觀的名詞迎合和強化了西方觀眾的成見。

主持人：紐約的丹尼爾，看起來你想發言。你請講。

丹尼爾·瓦格納：我想問王冠幾個問題，中國加入了《公約》，成為簽署國之一。從1982年簽署的那天起，《公約》就已成為一份法律文書，然而在很多場合中，中國一直在說，你看，其實我不喜歡這部分法律，我不喜歡那個裁定，所以我決定不遵守它。我想問的是，如果結果不是你想要的，你就不打算去遵守它，既然如此，簽署公約還有什么意義？這是一個問題。

王冠：丹尼爾，國際法中有一個概念叫作“保留條款”。

主持人：丹尼爾，你繼續。

丹尼爾·瓦格納：讓我先講完我的觀點。是的，但你們沒有參加仲裁，你們甚至都沒有在仲裁法院列席。另一個問題是專屬經濟區，它應該是一國向外延伸200海里。黃巖島和美濟礁，它們都位于距菲律賓海岸120海里處，而這些島嶼和中國最近的距離也有300海里，即海南島南方的西沙群島。所以，這些都不在中國的專屬經濟區范圍內，但美濟礁和黃巖島顯然在菲律賓的專屬經濟區內。中國全不理睬這些事實。如果這件事上，中國和菲律賓位置互換一下，我能想象中國肯定不會太高興。

主持人：讓王冠來回答一下這個問題。在華盛頓的王冠，請講。

王冠：丹尼爾，如果按地理遠近原則來裁定主權，那么想想北馬里亞納群島或關島吧，它們離西太平洋國家比離美國大陸似乎近了一點。還有，你提到中國為什么沒有參加這次仲裁，這是因為國際法中有個原則叫“保留條款”。很多公約都有“保留條款”。中國以及其他30多個西方國家，如丹麥、阿根廷、英國都簽署了這些“保留條款”?！氨Ａ魲l款”包括不允許仲裁法院對主權進行仲裁。這就是為什么中國從一開始就沒有參加仲裁。而中國遠不是第一個這樣做的國家，西方國家已這么做了。

丹尼爾·瓦格納：但遺憾的是，對中國來說面子上并不好看，因為這會被視為對國際法的藐視。我想補充最后一點，如果裁決有利于中國，我覺得它的政府會贊揚裁決結果，贊美這個機構及其智慧，而不是徹底地批評。這有點像熊孩子的表現。

主持人：可這就是政治啊。

王冠：當越南1976年在南沙群島建選第一條機場跑道時，美國并沒有跳出來批評越南，當菲律賓兩年后在南沙群島填海造陸時，美國也沒有跳出來批評菲律賓。后來，當菲律賓把一艘老軍艦停在仁愛礁不走的時候，美國還是沒有跳出來指責盟友菲律賓。奧巴馬總統甚至在今年3月接受《大西洋月刊》專訪時，明確承認了（美國）對中國的遏制戰略。我在這里一字不差地引述他的原話：“如果你看看我們是如何在中國南海進行操作，你就知道我們已經能夠調動大部分亞洲國家，通過讓中國十分驚訝的方式來孤立中國，坦白地說，這加強了我們與盟國的關系 ，對美國十分有利?！彼哉f，美國其實是通過政治手段、軍事部署并利用國際法來搞地緣政治。如果這還不是勾結起來對付中國，那我不知道什么才是。

丹尼爾·瓦格納：即便如此，這次（南海仲裁）也與美國無關，這最終與中國希望被視為怎樣的國家有關，與中國想被世界視為什么樣的大國有關。（中國）單方面采取行動，并認為這個裁決結果早就內定了，這不符合全球領導者的身份。中國單方面地（在南海）建立了一個事實上的軍事基地，然后聲稱它屬于中國，然后說反對其他國家的種種行為，這有點荒唐。

王冠：美國真的需要一個新的對華戰略了。他們利用保護海上通道和貿易為借口遏制中國。如果你看看數據，中國與東盟國家的貿易進行得相當好。中國作為世界上最大的貿易國，每年通過南海進行的貿易總額為5萬億美元。如果美國“重返亞太”的重點是安全原因，那么究竟是什么安全原因呢？是朝鮮嗎？可是朝鮮一直沒能成為真正的威脅。是恐怖主義嗎？可是極端組織“伊斯蘭國”（IS）和塔利班在地球的另一端。是核不擴散？可是大部分核彈頭都在東歐和西歐國家……

主持人：好的，先生們。王，我必須打斷一下。你提出了一些我們無法立即回答的重要問題。非常感謝我們在華盛頓和紐約的嘉賓。感謝收看“今日俄羅斯”節目的觀眾，下次再見！請記住精彩盡在《交叉辯論》。

英文原文

Peter Lavelle, CrossTalk host at RT America：An International tribunal in the Hague has ruled overwhelmingly against China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. Beijing not only rejects this ruling. It even refused to participate in the case.

To cross talk South China Sea, I am joined by Wang Guan in Washington. He is the chief political correspondent at CCTV America and in New York, we cross to Daniel Wagner. He is the CEO for Country Risk Solutions. Wang, if I can go to you first here. The issues of jurisdiction, participation and enforcement are all called into question by many people here.

Wang Guan, Chief Political Correspondent of CCTV America：Well Peter, if we forget about western mainstream press for a moment and look at UNCLOS chapter for chapter, we can see that this case, in its essence, is about a court that ruled on something it has no jurisdiction to rule on, based on a geopoliticized lawsuit filed by the Philippines against China. I will explain exactly what I mean. In Part 15, Section 3 and Article 298 of UNCLOS, it says a court does not have jurisdiction to rule on sovereignty. And did the court in the Hague rule on sovereignty? Well, in letter it did not but in spirit it did.

Let’s look at it. It ruled on nine-dash line, a claim by Beijing that it has some specific controls of the islands and their associated territorial waters. When you delegitimize that line, you delegitimize the sovereignty. So it is about sovereignty. Also it ruled on the land features, whether they are rocks or islands. Well, despite the fact that in Taiping Island and Yongxing Island, we have restaurants, banks, even internet, Wi-Fi and cellphone LTE signals, the court ruled that they are not islands so they can not confer 12-nautical mile territorial water. It is about territory. And eventually, also it ruled that China’s land reclamation is illegal which had something to do with territory and sovereignty. So the court, in a nutshell, ruled on sovereignty in the disguise of ruling on other things which violated the spirit, if not the letter of UNCLOS. Also if I may add, article 295 of UNCLOS said parties to a dispute should exhaust “local remedies”, meaning bilateral negotiations, before a party goes to the court and the Philippines did not do that.

Daniel Wagner, CEO of Country Risk Solutions：We can talk about word-smithing all we want. At the end of the day, what’s happening is China is claiming sovereignty over an enormous swaths of the South China Sea and no one but China agrees with it. It would be a bit like any other country saying you know I just like those bits of water and those islands and I think I will claim them for myself. In terms of seeking local remedies, well, many of the countries that are also party to this issue have sought local remedy with China but China has not been very forthcoming in that regard. I think it is a testament to the power of international law that small countries like the Philippines can take on the Goliath like China in this manner and prevail. Now the court ruled the way that it did not because it’s David against Goliath, the court ruled because it took a very close at the issues and it said this is unreasonable and it does not stand and no one besides China agrees.

Wang Guan：In fact, no western country supported China’s point of view. There are dozens of countries that supported China across the middle east, Africa and Eastern Europe. Those countries support China because they are not sold with the western narrative of the issue. Western narrative of the issue is very interesting in that they framed the issue very simplistically as if the Philippines 1 China 0 and China is not willing to abide by international laws. But I am not sure how many western editors and reporters read UNCLOS chapter for chapter or word for word, and then if they did, they would question the premise of their argument. That is, whether or not the arbitration court, the PCA, has the jurisdiction to, indirectly, rule on sovereignty in the first place. Also I am not sure how many western reporters and editors really talked to legal scholars from the other side and quoted them. Those scholars would point out that many legal principles actually supported Beijing’s point of view, such as Estoppel. Meaning if a country like Vietnam did in the 70s, once recognized China’s claim, as their Prime Minister Pham Van Dong did, they are not supposed to recant or withdraw their arguments decades later. We don’t see that in the western press. Also the western press framed the issue without context as if China started dumping sands and gravels in the middle of the ocean out of nowhere. They forgot the simple fact Ameria once sent naval vessels to help China claim those islands after WWII and once tacitly recognized China’s claims. We don’t see any of that. So yes, the western press are relatively free but free press have biases. Yes， they attribute each and every one of their sources. But who are their sources? How many non-western sources do they take seriously? Yes, they attribute each and every one of their adjectives, but how about their carefully-crafted nouns, such as Communist China or legallybinding arbitration. Those nouns really reinforce and feed into the stereotypes of the western audience.

Peter Lavelle：Daniel, looked like you wanted to jump in in New York. Go ahead.

Daniel Wagner：Well, I’d like to ask Wang to respond to a couple of issues. One is there are a number of instances where China has basically joined a legal regime UNCLOS being one of them and it has signed on the very day in 1982 when it became a legal instrument. And yet there’s been numerous instances where China has said you know I don’t actually like that portion of the law. I don’t like that ruling. So I am not gonna abide by it. So I would ask what is the point of signing on to the law if you don’t intend to abide by it when it doesn’t go the way you want it to go. That’s one issue.

Wang Guan：Well, Daniel, there is such a thing as reservations to a treaty.

Peter Lavelle ：Go ahead Daniel.

Daniel Wagner：Let me just finish my point. Yes， but you are not even showing up at this party. You are not even party to this particular issue in this court. The other issue is exclusive economic zones. That is supposed to go out 200 nautical miles. The Scarborough Shoal, the Mischief Reef, they are 120 miles from the Philippine coast, the closest of any of these islands in the South China Sea to China is almost 300 miles. The Paracel islands from the Hainan island in the South. So none of these are within China’s exclusive economic zone yet Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal are clearly in the Philippines’exclusive economic zone. It doesn’t seem to matter to China. But if this was done to China and the roles were reversed, I can imagine they wouldn’t be very happy.

Peter Lavelle：Let’s try to get Wang to respond to that. Wang in Washington.

Wang Guan：Well, Daniel, if geographical proximity is the rule, think about the Northern Mariana Islands or Guam. They are a little closer to the countries in the Western Pacific than to the continental United States. Also when you raised the point of why China did not attend this arbitration. It is because there is such a thing in international law called reservations. There are all reservations to treaties. China, along with some 30 other western countries, Denmark, Argentina, the UK, signed this reservation saying that it does not allow the court to rule on sovereignty. That’s why China did not attend the arbitration in the first place. China is hardly the first country to do that. It has companies in the west.

Daniel Wagner：And unfortunately, for China, China is not gonna look very good. Because it’s gonna be perceived as thumbing its nose at international law. I would add one last thing, which is, if this ruling had come out in favor of China. I suspect that the government would be praising it and praising the body and all of its wisdom instead of criticizing it outright and just sort of more or less acting like an intransigent child.

Peter Lavelle：That’s how politics works, okay.

Wang Guan：When Vietnam built the first airstrip in the Spratly Islands in 1976, Washington wasn’t too eager to jump to criticism of Vietnam. When the Philippines did it two years later by reclaiming some islands in the Spratleys, Washington didn’t jump to criticism of the Philippines and also when the Philippines grounded an old naval vessel in the Second Thomas Shoal or Ren’ai Jiao, Washington again did not jump to criticism of its ally the Philippines. President Obama even explicitly admitted the containment strategies (of China) in an interview with The Atlantic this March. He said and I quote, word for word, “if you look at how we’ve operated in the South China Sea,we have been able to mobilize most of Asia to isolate China in ways that have surprised China and frankly have very much served our interest in strengthening our alliances.” So in using politics, military deployment and international law, those issues. If this is not ganging up against China, I don’t know what is.

Daniel Wagner：It is really not about the US though. It is really ultimately about what kind of country China wants to be perceived as, what kind of global leader it wants to be perceived as in the global community. And the idea of unilaterally taking action and calling it a fait accompli is inconsistent with being a top leader at the table. To unilaterally go and to create a de facto military base and claim it as your own and say what are you objecting to, that doesn’t really make any sense.

Wang Guan：The US really needs a new strategic posture on China. Because they use excuses such as protecting the sea lanes and trade but if you look at those facts, China and the ASEAN countries traded quite alright. As the largest trading nation in the world, as China is, 5 trillion dollar’s worth of trade going through South China Sea every year. And also if Asia Pivot is about security issue, what exactly are those security issues? On North Korea？Well, North Korea has not been able to pull off a real existential threat. On terrorism？IS and the Taliban are half a world away. If on non-proliferation？Most of the nuclear warheads are in eastern Europe and western Europe.

Peter Lavelle：Okay gentlemen. Wang, I have to jump in here. You raised some very important questions we can’t answer right now. Many thanks for our guests in Washington and in New York. And thanks to our viewers for watching us here on RT. See you next time and remember CrossTalk rules.

辯論二：王冠與哈佛學者韋茨就美軍穿越南海的辯論
時間：2015年12月

中文翻譯

今日俄羅斯美洲臺主持人彼得·拉韋爾（以下簡稱“主持人”）：大家好，歡迎來到《交叉辯論》，在這里我們無所不談。我是彼得·拉韋爾。今天我們聚焦中國，以及亞太掀起的勢力版圖重新劃分浪潮。過去幾周中美上演了“比誰膽大游戲”（原文play chicken，即開車對撞看誰先躲）。兩國戰略博弈再起。中美間合作與對抗的循環會周而復始嗎？今天來討論中美海上對峙的嘉賓包括理查德·韋茨，他是美國哈德森研究所政治與軍事中心主任，高級研究員。同樣在華盛頓，我們請來了王冠，他是中國中央電視臺北美分臺首席時政記者?！督徊孓q論》的規則是，大家隨時可以插話，我也鼓勵大家這樣做。王冠，先從你開始吧。最近中美之間都有很多言辭，中國警告美國要尊重中國主權和國家安全。同時，美國說他們的海軍有權去任何地方行使自由航行權，中國無法阻攔。兩個大國，兩個強國，兩個利益發生沖突的國家，接下來會發生什么？

中國中央電視臺北美分臺首席時政記者王冠（以下簡稱“王冠”）：彼得，我覺得美國駛入南海是搞地緣政治多于原則性政策。讓我們面對這個問題吧：美國利用國際法，也就是《聯合國海洋法公約》，一個美國自己都沒有簽署的條約，來推進自己的地緣政治利益。讓我具體解釋一下：美國軍方說駛入南海是行使航行自由權。如果真的如此，美國應該客觀公正地行使這一權利。而實際上，美國海軍前往的地點都是精心挑選的。我們來看看：目前放眼全世界，有近100個主權存在爭端的島嶼。美國海軍為什么不去南大西洋的英稱?？颂m群島，即阿根廷所稱的馬爾維納斯群島呢？阿根廷一直對英國在那里的主權提出挑戰。美國海軍為什么不去地中海上西班牙控制的幾個島嶼呢？摩洛哥對那些島嶼的主權也正提出挑戰。美國海軍倒是去了黑海，而且是在俄羅斯去年收復克里米亞之際，如今美國海軍又來到了南海。其次，美國軍方說巡航南海的目的是保證航道通暢，確保貿易能夠自由流通。可是，南海上的貿易一直在自由流通著，這就是為什么每年有5萬億美元的貿易經過南海，這也就是為什么全球有50%的海上石油運輸經過南海。中國沒有阻礙或破壞這些貿易航道。

哈佛學者，美國哈德森研究所高級研究員理查德·韋茨（以下簡稱“理查德·韋茨”）：不，中國沒有那樣的意圖，但中國目前的行為可能會造成那樣的后果。這是大家所擔心的。目前，在美國良性霸權下，這些南海上的貿易航道暢通，太平洋上也沒有什么沖突，幾乎沒有，該區域創造了大量財富。但出于一些原因，中國正試圖改變這樣的現狀和規則，它希望自己的崛起大國的地位被接納。中國可能會無意中破壞現存的亞太秩序格局，中國創建的新秩序格局可能不如以前的有效。如果中國開始（在南海）建造人工島礁，那會將矛盾激化，商船會因此猶豫是否還要經行那里。我想中國沒有阻礙航運的意圖，但中國在南海的活動可能客觀上會造成這樣的后果，擾亂（南海）重要的運輸航道。

王冠：美國常嘲諷中國談南海的歷史性主權。他們常說，中國人就愛扯歷史。事實是，所有國家當今享有的主權領土都植根于歷史，包括美國。我們不要忘了，正是在1893年，美國外交官約翰·史蒂文斯發動政變推翻了夏威夷王國，才使其后來成為美國的一個州。在1898年美西戰爭后，美國占據了波多黎各和關島。1889年，美國發動軍事行動占領了如今的美屬薩摩亞。如果中國忽略這些史實，或者俄羅斯忽略這些史實，并派軍艦到這些島嶼12海里海域巡航，美國會做何感受呢？

主持人：你是否也覺得目前最大的問題是中國和美國都堅持自己的思維定式和習慣，他們都認為自己是正確的，認為對方應該做出調整。這樣下去大家會遇到麻煩，因為這種思維將導致沖突而不是溝通。

理查德·韋茨：我想這是一部分原因。另外中美想要的東西也不一樣。中國曾表示希望同美國劃分太平洋勢力范圍。中國曾說我們在西太平洋，給你們東太平洋，然后問題就解決了。但問題是，西太平洋的這些國家，有日本、菲律賓，還有其他國家和地區，這些國家和地區不想加入中國的勢力范圍。他們希望找到平衡，他們不希望同中國發生沖突，他們也不希望被劃入美國的勢力范圍。他們希望游離在中間，同中美兩國都有好的政治和軍事關系。問題是中國正在改變。如今你聽不到中國說，好吧，來談判吧?，F在我們只會聽到剛才所聽到的觀點，那就是那些（南海）島嶼自古屬于我們（中國），我們會管轄它們，我們有權建軍事設施，這是我們的地盤。

王冠：我覺得問題的關鍵是，美國認為必須通過重返亞洲來遏制中國，過去70年，美國國內一直把中國描繪成一個邪惡的共產主義國家。對共產主義的恐懼在過去很長時間內影響著美國的對華政策。因為外交政策也源于意識形態和思想。想想吧，20世紀50年代美國國內的麥卡錫主義和肯尼迪總統的多米諾理論都是在傳播共產主義國家如何恐怖。這種意識形態仍然在影響著今天的美國外交政策。中國被描述和塑造成了一個富有侵略性的共產主義國家，這就為美國遏制中國提供了理由。這就是美國當今外交政策的暗流。我覺得這種思想是不準確的。在外交政策上，中國不是一個富有侵略性的國家。你能想出中國在海外建立了哪塊殖民地嗎？過去40年，中國打過一場仗，美國打了多少場？

主持人：打了不少。理查德，我們節目時間快到了，從過去的事態推測，我們覺得美國不會真想和別人發生沖突，但同時它的確想重返亞太。

理查德·韋茨：我要澄清關于美國的重返亞太。與其說美國增加在亞太的軍事部署，不如說美國在世界其他地區縮減部署，這樣在亞太的軍事比例就增加了。中國是個不太尋常的大國。過去德國和日本崛起的時候，它們很激進地改變當時的國際秩序，使其符合自身利益。中國目前還沒有這樣做。但有一種顧慮是，中國比之前要果敢得多，而且不愿意退讓，越過了很多（美國認為的）紅線。

主持人：好的,理查德，節目時間到了。先生們，我們節目時間到了，很精彩的對話。謝謝我們華盛頓的嘉賓。謝謝收看“今日俄羅斯”的觀眾。別忘了精彩盡在《交叉辯論》，下次節目再會。

英文原文

Peter Lavelle, Host of RT America：Hello and welcome to CrossTalk, where all things are considered. I’m Peter Lavelle. The most recent China Wave on the remaking of the pacific. Over the last weeks, Beijing and Washington have upped the ante in their game of play chicken to determine who will have sway and influence. Do China and the US face nearly endless trials between accommodation and confrontation? To cross talk conflicting claims in the pacific, I’m joined by my guests, Richard Weitz, he is a senior fellow in director of the Center for political and military analysis in the Hudson Institute. Also in Washington, we have Wang Guan, he is the chief political correspondent at CCTV America. So in general cross talk rules, the fact means you can jump in any time you want and I very much encourage it. Guan, if I can go to you first in Washington D.C...A lot of words coming out of Beijing and Washington over the last couple of weeks, the Chinese are warning the Americans to respect China’s sovereignty and national security. At the same time, the Americans are saying they are going to sail and they are going to fly anywhere they want and China can’t do anything about it. Uh, two big countries, two great countries, two powerful countries at crossed purposes, where are we going with this?

Wang Guan, Chief Political Correspondent of CCTV America：Well Peter, I think this is more geopolitics than policy. I mean, let’s face it. America is using international law, namely the UN convention on the law of the sea, which by the way, the US didn’t even sign or ratify to advance, really, its geopolitical interests. Here’s what I mean, the US, the Pentagon is saying that it’s exercising freedom of navigation. But if so, navigation exercises should be conducted in a fair and objective manner. But the destinations are highly selective. Let’s look at it：there are around 100 disputed islands in the world today. Why didn’t the US navy send fleets to the Falkland Island, or Malvinas, which is controlled by the UK and contended by Argentina? Or why didn’t the US Navy go to the Mediterranean where a bunch of islands were controlled by Spain but contended by Morocco? Where the US Navy did go was places like the Black Sea, when Russia regained Crimea last year and now to South China Sea. And secondly, Pentagon is arguing that well, it is making sure that the sea lanes are open so trade can flow freely. Well, the trade in South China Sea has always been flowing freely. I mean that’s why 5 trillion dollar trade is going through South China Sea every year and 50% of global oil shipments going through that area. China didn’t do anything to hinder or hamper that process.

Richard Weitz, Harvard Scholar, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute：No, there’s no thinking that China has that intent but that could be the result if, you know, present trends continue. That’s the worry. So far, under benign American hegemony or whatever you’re gonna call it, these trade zones have stayed open, there’s been no conflicts in the Pacific, it’s very rare, have a lot of prosperity and the concern now is that for reasons we’ll probably be discussed soon, China’s trying to change rules, accommodate itself as a rising great power and in the process, they could inadvertently disrupt the existing pattern but not create something as effective as is in place. So if you start building artificial islands, you start exasperating the disputes. Then shippers will likely not to use that, I mean, you can just imagine even, I’m sure it’s not China’s intent but just the result could be disrupting those vital sea lines.

Wang Guan：America always ridiculed and teased about China’s historical claims on those islands in South China Sea and they think that, oh, the Chinese talk about history too much. Well, here’s the thing, all countries have historical basis to claim the areas, the territories they claim today, including the United States. Let’s think about it. Let’s not forget, in 1893, US diplomat John Stevens helped overthrow the Kingdom of Hawaii and incorporated it as a state and in 1898, after the US-Spanish war, the US got Puerto Rico and Guam from Spain and then in 1889, the US threw a military operation and occupied the American Samoa. If China ignores those historical basis on sovereignty, or Russia, and sends fleets to within 12 nautical miles of those islands, how would America think and feel?

Peter Lavelle：Do you think really one of the biggest problems is that the same mind-sets and habits of Washington and Beijing, I mean they both see themselves as being in the correct, in the right and the other one has to adjust to the other and this is where we’re getting a trouble because that’s a recipe for conflict and not for negotiation.

Richard Weitz：I’d imagine that’s part of it but of course, what they want is different. In fact, the Chinese have indicated they were open to some kind of sphere of influence agreement. They said you know, we will have the western Pacific and you guys can have the eastern pacific and then that will solve the problem. But the problem is the countries that would fall in that, that area, Japan, the Philippines, others don’t really want to be part of the Chinese sphere of influence. They kinda like a balance, they don’t wanna get into conflict with China, they don’t wanna be in American sphere of influence. They kinda like it where they can be in the middle and benefit from good political and military relations in the economic relations of both. I mean the thing is China’s changing, that’s the problem. You don’t hear about well, no, let’s make a deal, and it’s more basically what we just heard, it’s you know, these are ancient time territories, they belong to us, we will reserve them open for everybody, won’t militarize them, they belong to us.

Wang Guan：The gist of the problem is, US thinks that it must return to Asia to contain China because over the past 70 years, the message, the story of China being this evil, communist country has been really selling. This communist China fear mongering was behind the US policies because after all, all policies originated from ideology and ideas. If you think about the 60s when, in the 50s, the McCarthyism to President Kennedy’s domino effects theory about communism fear mongering all the way to the present day. Those ideology still affects US foreign policy. That painted and framed China as this aggressive communist country that the US has to contain, has to do something about. That is really the undercurrent of the current US foreign policy and we believe that is false. But externally, China is not an aggressivecountry. When can you think of a country, can you think of one overseas colony China established. In 40 years, China fought one war. How many did the US fight?

Peter Lavelle：Quite a few there. Richard, we are rapidly running out of time here. I want to go back to this kind of precedent there. I don’t think the US want to go to a shooting war with anybody in the Pacific OK? But at the same time it does have this pivot here.

Richard Weitz：Yes, just to clarify with the pivot or technically called the Re-balance to Asia, it is less that the US is increasing its military strength in the pacific, than it’s cutting back every where else. So the percentage of forces left in the pacific is rising but I would agree with the previous point that China is being unusually. Normally when a great power rises, think of Germany, Japan or others, then are wiling to go much more aggressive to restructure the international system in a way that they want. China has not done that so far but there are some concern that this new leadership is a lot more assertive and less willing to make compromise, and is crossing a lot of red lines that we haven’t seen before.

Peter Lavelle：OK Richard, on that point there, gentlemen, we are running out of time. Fascinating discussion. Many thanks to my guests in Washington. And thanks to our viewers for watching us on RT. Until next time, remember, CrossTalk rules.

[1]https://support.google.com/googlenews/answer/9005749?hl=en

[2]https://www.computerworld.com/article/2495365/business-intelligence/an-inside-look-atgoogle-s-news-ranking-algorithm.html

[3]https://www.blog.google/products/news/new-google-news-ai-meets-human-intelligence/

[4]另外需要說明，本書論述的數據支持，并非全部來自嚴格的實證分析。受到工作與生活情境的限制（當然，或許有時也得益于此），我的論述參考了過去10年個人的一線觀察，統計也時常依靠便利抽樣的原則。盡管如此，我相信，這些研究還是可以探測到美國貌似繁榮且自由的大眾傳播背后“看不見的手”。我將熱誠期待讀者對我的寫作提出批評與建議，它們都將成為我下一步更細致工作的開端。