The public good is the rule and measure of all law-making.If a thing be not useful to the commonwealth,though it be never so indifferent,it may not presently be established by law.And further,things never so indifferent in their own nature,when they are brought into the Church and worship of God,are removed out of the reach of the magistrate's jurisdiction,because in that use they have no connection at all with civil affairs.The only business of the Church is the salvation of souls,and it no way concerns the commonwealth,or any member of it,that this or the other ceremony be there made use of.Neither the use nor the omission of any ceremonies in those religious assemblies does either advantage or prejudice the life,liberty,or estate of any man.For example,let it be granted that the washing of an infant with water is in itself an indifferent thing,let it be granted also that the magistrate understand such washing to be profitable to the curing or preventing of any disease the children are subject unto,and esteem the matter weighty enough to be taken care of by a law.In that case he may order it to be done.But will any one therefore say that a magistrate has the same right to ordain by law that all children shall be baptised by priests in the sacred font in order to the purification of their souls?The extreme difference of these two cases is visible to every one at first sight.Or let us apply the last case to the child of a Jew,and the thing speaks itself.For what hinders but a Christian magistrate may have subjects that are Jews?Now,if we acknowledge that such an injury may not be done unto a Jew as to compel him,against his own opinion,to practise in his religion a thing that is in its nature indifferent,how can we maintain that anything of this kind may be done to a Christian?Again,things in their own nature indifferent cannot,by any human authority,be made any part of the worship of God-for this very reason:because they are indifferent.For,since indifferent things are not capable,by any virtue of their own,to propitiate the Deity,no human power or authority can confer on them so much dignity and excellency as to enable them to do it.In the common affairs of life that use of indifferent things which God has not forbidden is free and lawful,and therefore in those things human authority has place.But it is not so in matters of religion.Things indifferent are not otherwise lawful in the worship of God than as they are instituted by God Himself and as He,by some positive command,has ordained them to be made a part of that worship which He will vouchsafe to accept at the hands of poor sinful men.Nor,when an incensed Deity shall ask us,"Who has required these,or such-like things at your hands?"will it be enough to answer Him that the magistrate commanded them.If civil jurisdiction extend thus far,what might not lawfully be introduced into religion?What hodgepodge of ceremonies,what superstitious inventions,built upon the magistrate's authority,might not (against conscience)be imposed upon the worshippers of God?For the greatest part of these ceremonies and superstitions consists in the religious use of such things as are in their own nature indifferent;nor are they sinful upon any other account than because God is not the author of them.The sprinkling of water and the use of bread and wine are both in their own nature and in the ordinary occasions of life altogether indifferent.Will any man,therefore,say that these things could have been introduced into religion and made a part of divine worship if not by divine institution?If any human authority or civil power could have done this,why might it not also enjoin the eating of fish and drinking of ale in the holy banquet as a part of divine worship?

Why not the sprinkling of the blood of beasts in churches,and expiations by water or fire,and abundance more of this kind?But these things,how indifferent soever they be in common uses,when they come to be annexed unto divine worship,without divine authority,they are as abominable to God as the sacrifice of a dog.And why is a dog so abominable?What difference is there between a dog and a goat,in respect of the divine nature,equally and infinitely distant from all affinity with matter,unless it be that God required the use of one in His worship and not of the other?We see,therefore,that indifferent things,how much soever they be under the power of the civil magistrate,yet cannot,upon that pretence,be introduced into religion and imposed upon religious assemblies,because,in the worship of God,they wholly cease to be indifferent.He that worships God does it with design to please Him and procure His favour.But that cannot be done by him who,upon the command of another,offers unto God that which he knows will be displeasing to Him,because not commanded by Himself.

This is not to please God,or appease his wrath,but willingly and knowingly to provoke Him by a manifest contempt,which is a thing absolutely repugnant to the nature and end of worship.But it will be here asked:"If nothing belonging to divine worship be left to human discretion,how is it then that Churches themselves have the power of ordering anything about the time and place of worship and the like?"To this I answer that in religious worship we must distinguish between what is part of the worship itself and what is but a circumstance.