It is evident that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in the same sense as relatives.The one is not explained by reference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any other preposition used to indicate the relation.Similarly blindness is not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight.Relatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that with which it was correlative.But this is not the case.Sight is not called the sight of blindness.

That those terms which fall under the heads of 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated; for it is those, as we proved,' in the case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate.Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even, as instances.But those contraries which have an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity.It is not necessary that every substance, receptive of such qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in the subject.We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case of which the said necessity does not obtain.Yet when one of the two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white, it is necessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the subject; for fire cannot be cold, or snow black.Thus, it is not the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of which the one forms a constitutive property.Moreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and not either the one or the other,which must be present.

In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', on the other hand, neither of the aforesaid statements holds good.For it is not necessary that a subject receptive of the qualities should always have either the one or the other; that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind or to see.Thus 'positives' and 'privatives' do not belong to that class of contraries which consists of those which have no intermediate.On the other hand, they do not belong either to that class which consists of contraries which have an intermediate.For under certain conditions it is necessary that either the one or the other should form part of the constitution of every appropriate subject.For when a thing has reached the stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be said either to see or to be blind, and that in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for it is not necessary either that it should see or that it should be blind, but that it should be either in the one state or in the other.Yet in the case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found that it was never necessary that either the one or the other should be present in every appropriate subject, but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be present, and that in a determinate sense.It is, therefore, plain that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in either of the senses in which contraries are opposed.