5.Notice by Lord Canarvon prefixed to Gnostic Heresies (1875),and Burgon's Twelve Good Men.

6.See Mill's Examination of Hamilton,p.496.

7.Reprinted as the first two chapters in the Discussions on the 'Philosophy of the Unconditioned'and the 'Philosophy of Perception'.

8.Reid's Works,p.823.

9.See in Discussions,p.55;Lectures,i.295,etc.Reid's Works,p.817(the most elaborate).

10.Lectures,i.292.

11.Discussions,p.93.

12.Reid's Works,p.817n.

13.Discussions,p.56.

14.Ibid.p.192.

15.Lectures,i,230,293.Peter Poiret corresponds to 'Johnny Dodds of Farthinsacre,'the one orthodox friend of Davie Deans.

16.Lectures,i.331.

17.Discussions,p.61.

18.Discussions,p.61;Lectures,i.225.

19.Discussions,i.62.

20.Discussions,p.64.

21.Reid's Works,p.745.

22.Ibid.p.754.

23.Hamilton admits the distinction between 'primary truths of fact'and 'primary truths of intelligence,'but says that as their sources are not different,he will not give them different names.--Reid's Works,p.743n.

24.Reid's Works,p.743.

25.Lectures,i.294.

26.Lectures,i.228.

27.Ibid.i.224.

28.Ibid.i.212.

29.Reid's Works,p.822.

30.Lectures,i.204.

31.Ibid.i.194.

32.Reid's Works,p.744.

33.Ibid.p.806.

34Discussions,p.50,etc.Lectures,i,225,etc.

35.Discussions,p.639.This is the passage welcomed by Mill.

Hamilton,as Mr Stirling notices,applies to the Cosmothetical Idealist Virgil's Rerumque ignarus,imagine gaudet,and elsewhere uses the same words to give the position of the true philosopher (Discussions,pp.57,640;Lectures,i.138).The inability to get beyond the phenomenon is ridiculed in one case and accepted in the other.

36.Lectures,i.225.

37.Ibid.i.147;ii.129.

38.Ibid.i.160.

39.Mill puts this in Examination,p.35.

40.Reid's Works,pp.854,857.

41.Lectures,ii.112.In the more elaborate discussion in Reid's Works.Note D,he concludes (p.857)that the primary 'may be roundly characterised as mathematical,the secundo primary as mechanical,the secondary as physiological.'

42.Lectures,ii.113,114.

43.Reid's Works,p.845.

44.Ibid.p.820.

45.Ibid.p.858.

46.Reid's Works,p.866n.

47.Lectures,ii.114.

48.Reid's Works,p.882.

49.Ibid.p.846.

50.Mr Hutchison Stirling,in a severe examination of Hamilton's Philosophy of Perception (1865,p.79n.)thinks that Hamilton never understood that,according to Kant,space was a 'perception',not a 'conception';and infers that he knew little of Kant except from the 'literature of the subject.'

51.Lectures,i.218.

52.Mill's argument about this in the Examination (ch.x.)is entangled in the question about the opinions of Thomas Brown and 'Cosmothetic Idealists,'which perhaps lays him open to a reply made by Veitch.I cannot go into this,which illustrates one confusion in the controversy.

53.Lectures,i.218and 221n.

54.Ibid.ii.153.

55.Ibid.ii.130.

56.Reid's Works,Note B,p.810.

57.Reid's Works,p.821.

58.Reid's Works,p.858n.cf.p.880n.The 'organism'is 'at once objective and subjective','at once ego and non-ego.'Unless we admit this we must be materialists or idealists.

59.Reid's Works,p.862.

60.Mr Stirling (pp.80-110)thinks this 'exceedingly ingenious',though really fallacious.Mansel accepts it in his Metaphysics (1860),p.114;and in the Philosophy of the Conditioned (pp.72,75,83)tries to reconcile it with other phrases.He talks of matter being 'in contact with mind,'and the object of perception being 'partly mental and partly material.'The composition is like the chemical fusion of an acid and an alkali.

61.Veitch tries to make a coherent doctrine from these utterances.All that Hamilton requires,he thinks,is that the object perceived his the 'quality of a non-ego.'--Veitch's Hamilton,p.191.As the non-ego is a merely negative conception,this tends to coincide with the doctrines of Tracy and Brown.

62.Mill had by this time read Kant,and makes frequent references to him.He may perhaps be excused for not appreciating the Kantian view by Kant's own inconsistencies and obscurities.

This is a very ticklish point,which I cannot discuss,but which,as I think,does not really affect the argument.

63.Examination,etc.p.176.Mill here uses 'introspective,'which might be applied to psychology,as equivalent rather than to logical;or to the a priori method which attempts to discover fact by analysis of pure reasoning.

64.Examination,etc.p.456;cf.p.194.

65.Examination,etc.p.266.

66.Cf.Mill's interesting article upon Berkeley.--Dissertations,vol.iv.pp.154-87.

67.Examination,p.248.

68.Ibid.p.225.

69.Made especially familiar in recent English speculation by T.H.Green's criticism of Hume.

70.e.g.Reid's Works,p.869.

71.Examination,pp.146-47.

72.Ibid.p.235.

73.Examination,p.248.

74.Lectures (Preface).

75.Discussions,p.12.

76.Ibid.p.13.

77.Examination,pp.58,73.

78.Philosophy of the Conditioned,p .95.

79.Philosophy of the Conditioned,pp.108,147.

80.Ibid.p.67.

81.Hamilton strangely declares that Kant makes the speculative reason an 'organ of mere delusion'(Discussions,p.18,Lectures,i.402),and Mansel says that if we accept Kant's doctrine we must believe 'in a special faculty of lies,created for the express purpose of deceiving those who believe in it.'For Kant's statement that the reason cannot be itself untrustworthy,see Appendix to Transcendental Dialectic (section on 'the ultimate end of the natural dialectic of human reason,'and for the comparisons above quoted the same Appendix (section of 'the regulative employment of the 'ideas of pure reason')and the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic.Bolton (Inquisitio Philosophica,ch.iv)quotes many passages from Kant to illustrate this point,which seems to confirm Stirling's opinion of the superficiality of Hamilton's knowledge of his author.

82.Discussions,p.33.

83.Discussions,p.17.